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I. Introduction
THERE IS A GENERAL consensus that U.S. financial markets are very competitive
and efficient, with prices quickly refiecting the available information. Tbere is
also a widespread belief tbat these competitive and efficient markets enable tbe
efficient allocation of scarce capital among alternative investment opportunities.
This belief is not based on direct observation—it is virtually impossible to obtain
tbe data concerning tbe joint probability distribution of returns to all possible
projects wbicb would be required for a direct assessment of tbe efficiency of tbe
resource allocations to which the market gives rise. Rather, it is based on the
well-known result that perfectly competitive markets generate Pareto efficient
resovirce allocations.
The object of tbis paper is to question tbat conclusion, to sbow that even with
apparently competitive and "efficient" markets, resource allocations may not be
Pareto efficient.
n. The Concepts of Market Efficiency and Pareto Optimality
The vocabulary wbicb bas become popular witbin tbe financial literature has
given rise to some confusion concerning the relationship between competitivity
of markets and tbe efficiency of the economy. To an economist, "efficiency" of
the market has a simple meaning: the allocation of resources generated by the
market is said to be efficient (Pareto optimal) if tbere does not exist an alternative
feasible resource allocation which can make some individual better off witbout
making someone else worse off. There are some subtle problems in defining tbe
set of feasible allocations; in particular, in tbe kinds of situations with which we
shall be concemed bere, where information is costly and markets may be incom-
* Princeton University. This paper surveys a large literature on the optimality of financial markets.
Because of limitations of space, it is necessarily selective in coverage and in references. Since my
objective, in part, is to bring to the attention of finance economists some recent results in the general
theory of imperfect information and uncertainty, the ratio of such articles cited to articles more
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plete, an analysis of the efficiency of markets must take into account the costs
associated with establisbing markets and obtaining information. '^^
In the finance literature, the term "efficient markets" has come to take on some
slightly different meanings. The two most widely employed refer to informational
efficiency:
"A market in which prices fully reflect available information is cedled 'efficient."'
(Fama (1970) p. 383.)
"A market is efficient with respect to information set Ot if it is impossible to make
economic profits by trading on the basis of information set Ot." (Jensen, [1978].)
and mean variance efficiency—prices in the market correspond to an equilibrium
in wbicb aU individuals evaluate portfolios in terms of their means and variances,
about which they all have identical beliefs.
Somewbat surprisingly, altbough interest in both concepts was undoubtedly
motivated by a concern witb the efficiency with which investment resources are
allocated in a competitive economy, these concepts have not been directly related
to tbe Pareto optimality of the economy. As we shall show, efficiency in these
senses is neither necessary nor sufficient for the Pareto optimality of the
economy.
There are three levels to the analysis of the efficiency of the market:
(a) Exchange efficiency. Given the set of assets which are available, and tbe
information (beliefs) of tbe various participants, are tbe available assets traded in
sucb a way tbat there is no rearrangement of ownership claims which would
increase the expected utility of one individual without decreasing that of some
other?^
(b) Production efficiency. In exchange efficiency, the set of assets (securities)
which are available is assumed to be given. Here, tbe concern is with the
determination of the supply of various assets, given the available tecbnology,
resources, and information. The analysis of production efficiency turns on three
questions: (i) If firms maximize their market value, will the resource allocation be
Pareto optimal? (ii) Would all sbarebolders wish firms to maximize their market
value? If not, will there be unanimity in tbe actions they wish the firm to pursue?
If there is unanimity, wiU the actions which are unanimously preferred be Pareto
optimal? If not, what can we say about tbe equilibrium? (iii) Are there any
' It has become fashionable to refer to notions of optimality when the number of markets are given
(and cannot be altered by govemment action) or when information is imperfect and costly, as
constrained optima (or occasionally second best optima). But these costs are no less real than the
costs of production. Simply because economists have ignored these costs in the past is no reason that
we should treat these aspects of technology as "secondary" to those aspects of technology upon which
economists have focused.
^ Without a clear specification of the information/transactions technology, there is always a danger
that any intervention in the economy designed, say, to alleviate problems arising from an absence of
risk markets will either be infeasible or so costly to implement that it would not, in fact, constitute a
Pareto improvement, for precisely the same reasons that the markets were absent in the first place.
In the analysis below, these qualifications do not appear to have much force.
^ The analysis does not, of course, require that individuals be expected utility maximizers; here, as
elsewhere in this paper, we have not attempted to put the arguments in their most general form.
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control mechanisms which ensure that the managers of firms will in fact pursue
the policies which are in the interests of shareholders?
(c) Information efficiency. In the economists' conventional analysis of effi-
ciency (as typified, say, by the Arrow-Debreu model), the beliefs about tbe
probability distributions of various events (states) are given exogenously. Finan-
cial economists bave rightly emphasized the importance of markets in conveying
information. Information efficiency requires that: (i) the market must provide the
correct incentives for gathering the right amount and kind of information; (ii) the
market prices must reflect the information available to the various traders;'' and
(iii) firms must be able to convey efficiently information about tbeir prospects to
potential investors.
It is tbus apparent tbat market efficiency, in the sense in which it has come to
be used by finance economists, is only one part of overall market efficiency. But
even more to tbe point, were tbe market to be informationally efficient in tbe
sense of Fama and Jensen, investors would have no incentive to gather informa-
tion. The only information that would be reflected in tbe market is costless
information. Thus a market which was efficient in the Fama-Jensen sense would
almost surely not be Pareto optimal.
Outline of the argument. In tbis paper we shall present several theoretical
arguments which should make it apparent that there is no theoretical presump-
tion simply because tbe financial markets appear to be competitive, or "pass" the
standard finance literature tests concerning efficiency,^  that they are efficient.
The argument has three parts.
First, we establisb that value maximization leads to (constrained) Pareto
optimality only under restrictive conditions. Secondly, we show that there is a
strong presumption against the informational efficiency of the economy, when
that concept is appropriately defined in terms of the role the market plays in
attaining the objective of a Pareto optimal resource allocation. Finally, we argue
that there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that firms wiU not bebave as
if tbey were maximizing tbeir market value (bowever tbat is defined). An analysis
of firm bebavior must take into account tbe fact that the interests of managers
normally will differ from that of shareholders, but the limitations of control of
managers by sbareholders and inherent limitations in altemative control mech-
anisms (such as take-overs) leave managers a large element of discretion to
pursue policies that are not consistent with value maximization. These informa-
tion-incentive considerations do, however, provide the basis of a meaningful
tbeory of the optimal financial structure of the firm, which we briefiy sketcb in
Section 5. On the other hand, it can be shown that the equilibrium which emerges
does not, in general, lead to Pareto optimal resource allocations.
Underlying all of our analysis is the observation tbat the presumption that
competitive markets lead to Pareto optimal resource allocations is based on the
•* We are, at this point, deliberately vague about what is entailed by "prices reflecting infonnation."
See below. Section IV.
'' We shall, in fact, have little to say about these tests. For several recent studies questioning various
aspects of market efficiency on empirical grounds, see the symposium in the Journal of Financial
Economics edited by M. Jensen and Ross's survey of the Capital Asset Pricing Model [1978b].
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Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics; but this theorem makes stringent,
and unrealistic, assumptions concerning completeness of markets and the exo-
geneity of information (in particular, that individual beliefs about tbe character-
istics of various securities or investments and about the likelihood of various
events are given exogenously, and thus unaffected by any action of any participant
in the market, by tbe prices which prevail in the market, or by any other-
information which an investor might acquire, either freely or by an expenditure
of resources). Tbese assumptions make tbe standard analysis particularly inap-
propriate for understanding tbe functioning of capital markets, where some of
the main issues of concern center around the role of markets in conveying
information.
in . Does Value Maximization Lead to (Constrained) Pareto Optimality?
With a complete set of risk markets, it is easy to establisb that all shareholders
would wish the firm to maximize their market value. Moreover, the existence of
a complete set of markets provides firms with an easy way of calculating the
effect on market value of any action which they might take; they simply evaluate
the output of the firm at the state-contingent prices which are assumed to be
invariant to the actions of the firm. Finally, the market allocation which is
generated in this way, can be shown to be Pareto optimal. The assumption of a
complete set of markets is clearly unrealistic. Thus attempts have been made to
find weaker sets of sufficient conditions under wbicb the market provides the
requisite information which would enable firms to determine the effect of any
action on market value,^ and to assess, for these special cases, whether the market
allocation is a (constrained) Pareto optimum.
3.1. TAe ModigUani-Miller-Diamond Model and Its Extensions
In the first set of models to be dicussed, there is only a single output. If each
firm produces a single pattern of returns across the states of nature (i.e. the
relative outputs in each state are fixed), and there are a large number of firms
producing the same pattern, then there will be a competitive market for each of
these "pattems." (Modigliani and Miller refer to these as risk classes.) Standard
competitive analysis can be directly applied to these "composite" commodities:
all shareholders will wish their firm to maximize the net market value (the value
of output minus the value of inputs); and the market value of the firm is simply
determined as the number of "units" of tbe pattern of returns times tbe price per
unit, which, as in the earlier analysis, is assumed to be invariant to tbe action of
the firm. It is also immediate that, given that the govemment is constrained in
the same way that the market is (i.e. it is restricted to producing the same set of
"composite commodities" and to distributing income to individuals by means of
tbese composite securities), market allocations are efficient. (See Diamond
[1967].)
" Without a complete set of risk markets, maximizing current market value and "long run" market
value may require quite different policies. We ignore this distinction, focusing only on short run value
maximization. But see Stiglitz [1972b].
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The parallel with the analysis of conventional commodities should be clear:
tbere could exist a competitive market for automobiles, even tbough there did
not exist markets for steering wheels, fenders, etc. An automobile is a composite
commodity, and so long as tbere are competitive markets for the composite
commodity, the standard competitive analysis is directly applicable.
Again, from here, it is only a slight generalization to the observation that the
pattern of returns of any one firm need not be identical to tbat of any other firm,
so long as its (marginal) output can be written as a linear combination of tbe
output oftwo or more other firms (provided short sales are allowed). The precise
specification of the required "spanning" conditions has been tbe subject of an
extensive literature (surveyed in Baron [1979]).
Tbere are two basic objections to these models: first, the assumption of
spanning, from a technological point of view, seems implausible. The output of
most firms depends on events which are specific to that particular firm. Secondly,
among the decisions which a firm must make are those relating to its financial
structure. Although it is well known that these decisions have no general equilib-
rium consequences provided the firm does not go bankrupt in any state of nature
(Stiglitz [1974a]), there is no reason to restrict firms to debt-equity ratios within
the range which ensure a zero probability of bankruptcy (and in practice, there
is considerable evidence that for many firms the market believes there is a finite
probability of bankruptcy, reflected in tbe rates of interest on tbeir bonds.) But
tben, Grossman and Stiglitz [1977, 1980a] have shown that if the spanning
condition is to be satisfied for tbis set of decisions, tbere must, effectively, be a
complete set of markets.
As we sbaU point out in Section 3.3, the first objection may not be particularly
serious. We present tbere some further objections to the "spanning" model. More
significantly, we establish in Sections 3.4-3.6 that even with spanning, markets
will not be efficient if there is more than one commodity or if the set of "common
market factors" is endogenously determined.
3.2. Mean Variance Models
There is another, slightly more persuasive approach, which looks for conditions
(restrictions on technology, tastes) under which a fuU set of markets is not
necessary; were a fuU set of markets available, some of the markets would be
redundant (i.e. would have no trade).
Two categories of such models have been investigated. The first is the mean-
variance model with homogenous expectations. Then, aU individuals will buy the
same portfolio of risky assets.^ What is particularly attractive about this model is
that it generates a simple formula for the valuation of risky assets
(1) Vi = [Xi - kEiX, - Xi){M - iif )]/r
The sets of utility functions under which all individuals purchase the same risky portfolio (or
linear combinations of a set of mutual funds) though more general than the quadratic, is still very
restrictive. See Cass-Stiglitz [1970]. The set of restrictions on distributions has been studied by Ross
[1978a].
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where
V, is the value of the ith firm,
Xi is the retum to the firm, and Xi its mean,
M is the retum to a portfolio consisting of the market; and
r is the rate of interest.
The value of the firm is proportional to mean output, reduced by an amount to
take account of risk. The latter is simply equal to the correlation of the firms
output with the market, times a risk discount factor k.
Equation (1) would, under the stipulated conditions, describe tbe values of
different firms in the economy at any moment of time. If there are a large number
of firms, it seems reasonable tbat firms would believe tbat were tbey to vary their
production decisions slightly, their action would leave unaffected the market rate
of interest and the risk discount factor. Stiglitz [1972a] and Jensen and Long
[1972] establisbed that if firms maximize their stock market value, given these
beliefs, then the market allocation would not be Pareto optimal. The market
seems, in such circumstances, to over evaluate own variance.
There were three criticisms of this analysis.^ First, it was argued that firms
would not take the risk discount factor as given. It is obvious tbat tbere is a
particular variation in tbe risk discount factor wbicb would support a Pareto
optimum, but tbere is no persuasive reason wby firms would hypothesize that
particular value. Indeed, although the calculation of the risk discount factor is, in
general, a complicated matter, for the special case where all individuals have
constant absolute risk aversion utility functions, it can be shown to be related
simply to individuals' risk aversion; bence, tbe cbange in investment decision by
one firm would, in fact, leave the risk discount factor unaffected.
The difficulties encountered here in the analysis of the appropriate equilibrium
concept are, in fact, no different from those encountered in standard competitive
analysis. If there are a finite number of firms in a market, as there always are, the
action of any one firm will have an effect on the price and/or actions of other
firms; when there are a small number of firms, tbe strategic interactions of firms
is an essential part of the analysis of markets. When there are a large (but still
finite) number of firms, bowever, we ignore these interaction effects. We postulate
that the firm acts as if it were a price taker, even though it may have a (barely
perceptible) effect on price. Tbis is to be viewed as a behavioral postulate, one
which is, I think, plausible under the stipulated conditions. Our equilibrium
analysis explores tbe implications of a similar bebavioral postulate. I find the
assumption in this context that firms take the risk discount factor as given a
more plausible behavioral assumption tban, say, tbe assumption tbat firms
calculate the average value of the marginal rate of substitution between income
in different states, or between mean and standard deviation and assume these
"implicit prices" are constant.
The second criticism was that the analysis depended critically on there being
a fixed number of firms. Under the circumstances, there would be a strong
* There are, of course, a number of more general criticisms of the capital asset pricing model; see,
for instance, Ross [1978b], Jensen [1978] and the next subsection.
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incentive to create additional firms, so long as the new firms were not perfectly
correlated with the old firms. (See Merton and Subrahmanyam [1974].) If,
however, there are fixed costs associated with establisbing additional firms one
can easily formulate a model in which the number of firms is endogenous, and
sufficiently small tbat tbe risk discount factor is not zero. (See Stiglitz [1975b].)
Tbe tbird response was the individuals would not wish firms to maximize
their stock market value. This is in fact the case, but in those situations where
shareholders do not wish the firm to maximize the market value, there will, in
general, not be unanimity about wbat policy should be pursued. (See Grossman-
Stiglitz [1980a].)
3.3. Factor Models
Tbere is an alternative set of assumptions under which a complete set of risk
markets is not required, which under suitable restrictions generates a Pareto
optimal resource allocation in the single commodity world. This postulates that
the output of any firm can be written as a linear function of certain common
market factors fij and certain individualistic factors,
(2) Y, = I liijiij -I- e,.
It is then postulated that the individualistic factors are uncorrelated, and that
there is a sufficiently large number of firms that individuals can diversify out of
this "firm specific" risk. (The argument has been developed in more precise terms
by Ross [1976].) Now there will be a "price," qj, associated with each market
factor, is.j\ again the value of the firm can be determined simply as tbe sum of tbe
values of its components,
(3) Vi = Y,qjiij.
Given tbe large number of securities in the market, arid the ability to diversify
which the market seems to afford, this would seem to be a plausible model. But
a model should be evaluted in terms of all of its predictions; many of tbe
predictions of a simple tbeory may in fact be borne out, but if there are other
predictions which seem inconsistent with the facts, the theory should at least be
questioned; and alternative tbeories, consistent witb all the relevant facts, need
to be constructed. There are at least three observations which seem inconsistent
with the simple factor model. (These objections, it sbouid be observed, appear to
be equally applicable to tbe standard capital asset pricing model.)
First, an examination of individual portfolios suggests that a significant fraction
of individuals are not sufficiently diversified that the firm specific risk can be
ignored. Theoretical reasons (jissociated with imperfect information) for this are
discussed in Section 4.
Secondly, if firms are valued as the factor model assumes and firms seek to
maximize their market value, the only information which firms should seek in
assessing any project would be tbe amount of each "factor" contained in the
project. Typically this information is not reported, and indeed, information about
risk (own variance) is commonly employed in project assessments wbich the
factor model suggests should be irrelevant (indeed tbe very fact tbat such
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information is collected is evidence against the model, if there is any cost to
collecting this information.)®
Finally, the model has extremely strong and unrealistic implications when taxes
are introduced. As investors and the IRS both know, the special provisions
pertaining to long term capital gains mean that if the individual could buy and
seU short the same security (a "wash sale") the individual could reduce his taxes
at least to the point where the limitations on deductibility of short term losses
are binding. (Since tbere are straigbtforward ways of converting interest income
and ordinary income losses to sbort term capital gains, the loss off-set limitations
may not be very binding.) It is precisely because of tbis that the IRS does not
allow wash sales. But the factor model says that individuals can in effect engage
in wash sales, not buying and seUing the same securities, but buying and selling
tbe same factors. Indeed, were tbere no restrictions on loss-offsets, no one would
pay any taxes. In fact, individuals do pay taxes, and indeed for relatively few
individuals are the loss-offset constraints binding. This may, of course, be because
of transactions costs. This suggests that either the factor model does not provide
a good description of the market, or that the transactions costs, constraints on
short sales, etc. are of first-order importance in determining demands for securi-
ties, and any analysis which omits them may therefore be seriously misleading.
3.4. Multi-commodity Models
The only essential difference between the multi-commodity model and the
single commodity model is that profits depend not only on the output of the firm
in each state of nature, but also on the price at which it can sell that output. In
a competitive market, it is reasonable to assume that the firm believes tbat the
price in each state of nature is unaffected by its actions; tbus, if each firm has
"multiplicative uncertainty" (i.e. relative output in different states of nature is
fixed), it believes tbat by doubling its scale of output, its market value wiU be
doubled. But wben all firms increase their scale, not only does the level of prices
change, but, more importantly, prices cbange by different relative amounts in
different states of nature. Thus, for the industry as a whole, there is not
multiplicative uncertainty: changing the level of investment does change relative
profits in different states. Changing the investment level changes the set of risk
markets; firms wiU not take this into account but a social planner would. As a
result, tbe market equilibrium is almost never a (constrained) Pareto optimum.
Virtually tbe only cases in wbich it wiU be are those in which the stock market is
irrelevant, e.g. when all individuals are identical or in which the demand functions
have unitary elasticity, so profits are independent of output—there is no effective
' The objection that firms may have been speaking prose without knowing it—that they may have
acted in accordance with the factor model without being able to articulate it—is not valid here;
judgments about projects will inevitably be determined by the kind of information collected and
reported. If information about own variance is obtained, but information concerning correlation with
market factors is not, it seems implausible that the decisions will be made on the latter basis and not
the former. Nor are the objections of the kind raised to the mark-up pricing model that firms use
rules of thumb in the short run, but in the long run behave in accordance with the theory, plausible.
The factor model provides a basis of simplifying the calculations; even if it were only approximately
correct, there would be strong incentives for firms to adopt it as a "rule of thumb."
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risk. (See Stiglitz [1975a, 1980a].) (As Hart [1975] pointed out, these inefficiencies
can arise even in pure exchange economies.)
Note that the model we have just described is consistent with the factor model.
A cross sectional study of various firms would show that the market value of
each firm is described by an equation of the form (2). In this example, however,
the market factors are, in effect, endogenous. To put it another way, the market
may not be efficient in its cboice of market factors.
The next two subsections provide furtber examples of this kind of inefficiency.
3.5. Endogeneity of Markets
It can be shown that opening new markets (which would appear to reduce the
degree of market imperfection) may actually lower everyone's welfare. The
opening of a market changes the price distribution. In tbe absence of a complete
set of risk markets, prices serve botb a risk function (since price and output are
often negatively correlated) a well as the usual market clearing function. Their
ability to perform this risk function may be seriously impaired by the opening of
an additional market just as it was altered in the previous subsection by the level
of investment. (See Newbery-Stiglitz [1979]); for examples involving exchange
economies, see Hart [1975].)
3.6. Complementarities in Risk Markets
The "risk" associated with one firm's choice of a production plan clearly
depends on the actions of other firms; if other firms' profits are negatively
correlated with the profits generated by a particular production plan, then that
production plan may not be viewed as risky. Tbe question arises, is tbe equilibrium
wbich emerges when each makes its production decisions independently neces-
sarily efficient."* When there is an incomplete set of markets, it is known that the
answer, in general, is negative: the demand for tea may depend on the availability
of sugar, and conversely; if no sugar is produced, it may not pay to produce tea;
and if no tea is produced it may not pay to produce sugar. Tbe decisions to
produce tea and sugar cannot be made in a decentralized manner. Similarly,
Stiglitz [1972a] bas constructed an example in wbicb tbere are two groups of
firms, eacb with two choices of techniques. It is shown that there are two
equilibria: given that group 1 chooses, say, technique A, it pays group 2 to use
technique C (because A and C are more negatively correlated than A and D); but
given tbat group 1 cbooses tecbnique B, it pays group 2 to use tecbnique D. Yet
one of tbe equilibria Pareto dominates the other.
3.7. Monopolistic Competition and the Capital Market
Before completing our discussion of the consequences of incomplete markets,
we should mention an important analogy which does have direct implications for
the assessment of the optimality of the market. The theory of monopolistic
competition is concemed with situations where, because of the fixed costs of
'° The question does not arise in the Modigliani-Miller-Diamond model of Section 3.1, since there
the only decision of the firm is the scale of production.
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producing different commodities, not all commodities which could be are pro-
duced. Again, tbere is an incomplete set of markets. For any commodity, tbere
may exist close, but imperfect, substitutes. An extensive recent literature (see
Salop [1979]), Spence [1976], Dixit-Stiglitz [1977], and Lancaster [1979]) bas not
only establisbed that, in general, the market allocations wiU not be (constrained)
Pareto optima, but also identified tbe nature and source of the biases. Tbere is a
clear parallel between incomplete risk markets and incomplete commodity mar-
kets. (See Stiglitz [1975b], Dreze [1974].)
rv. Information and the Efficiency of Markets
One of the central functions of stock markets presumbly is to convey information
from investors (about their attitudes to risk, beliefs about different projects, etc.)
to firms. Yet the standard model has little to say about tbis information process:
about the incentives it provides for the gathering of information (both about tbe
likelibood of various events and about tbe cbaracteristics of various securities),
and the efficiency with which it transmits it. There is another equally important
information transmission problem: since managers may be more informed about
tbe investment opportunites available to tbe firm, they must somehow convey
this information to potential investors. Capital markets in which it is costly to
obtain and transmit information look substantially different from those in which
information is assumed to be perfect, and they fail to possess the standard
optimality properties.
4.1. Prices and Infonnation
In financial markets, prices serve two roles; not only do they clear markets,
they also convey and aggregate information. Thus prices perform a quite distinct
role from that ascribed to them in traditional competitive analysis, and the
optimality theorems which have been proved for tbat case do not directly apply
bere. Before turning to these welfare questions, however, we ask, do prices "fully
refiect" all the information. If markets were perfectly efficient in transmitting
information from the informed to the uninformed, informed individuals would
obtain no return on tbeir investment in information; thus, the only information
which can, in equilibrium, be efficiently transmitted is costless infonnation. With
costly information, markets cannot be fully arbitraged. (See Grossman-Stiglitz
[1976, 1980b].)
We noted earlier the ambiguity in tbe term "fuUy refiect" in the definition of
informationally efficient markets. A natural interpretation is that by observing
prices one can infer all tbe information of tbe participants in the market. Since
the dimensionality of markets is smaller than the dimensionality of information,
there would appear to be a strong presumption that markets could not be fully
revealing (even of costless information). The question then arises, are there
restrictions on preferences or distributions, sucb that the market is fuUy revealing
of all information which is relevant to individual decision making. Although a
variety of such conditions have been discussed in tbe literature (see, e.g. Grossman
[1977]), they are very restrictive. For instance, even if all distributions are normal.
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and all individuals have constant absolute risk aversion, for a futures market to
be fully revealing requires that there be only demand or supply disturbances to
tbe market. (See Bray [1979].)"
Altbough there has not yet been a tborougb analysis of the welfare implications
of these models, there appears to be a strong presumption tbat the incentives
provided by tbe market for the acquisition and transmission of information do
not generate optimal resource allocations (even taking into account the costs of
acquiring and transmitting information). First, to the extent that information is
quickly revealed by tbe market, individuals will not have an incentive to obtain
it, even when it might be socially useful. Tbere would appear to be a bias in favor
of acquiring information wbicb is individual-specific, i.e. is of value only to the
individual acquiring the information. Secondly, as in our earlier discussion,
although the action of any single individual in acquiring information may have
no effect on the price distribution, tbe actions of all individuals do, and, when
markets are incomplete, this chjuige in the price distribution has welfare conse-
quences which each individual ignores. Thus, if no one knows the state of nature,
the price of a risky asset must be independent of the state of nature, while if a
significant fraction of the population obtains some information about tbe state,
the price will vary accordingly. This increase in the variability in tbe price of tbe
asset imposes a risk on individuals, which, without a complete set of insurance
markets, they may not be able to dispose of. Thirdly, as Hirshleifer [1971]
emphasized, some of the gains of the informed are at the expense of the
uninformed. The retum to information is partly rent-acquisition; it is not a real
social return.
4.2. Screening Alternative Investments
I]t is clear that some firms are better tban others; one of the central problems
of the investor is selecting out, or screening, the "good" investments from the bad
ones. Screening equilibria have recently been the subject of extensive study
(Spence [1973]; Stiglitz [1975c, 1981]; Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976]), and the ideas
developed there have some immediate applications to capital markets.
There are two quite separate strands in the literature, one focusing on the
behavior of firms (the users of the capital), and the other focusing on the behavior
of banks (one of the primary sources of funds to the firm). A fuU understanding
of market equUibrium requires that these two strands be brought together.
(i) Better firms have an incentive to have themselves identified as better firms;
tbey are willing to pay for audits, advertising, etc. to persuade potential investors
that they are, in fact, better, since if tbey are successful, their market value
increases. Their gains are, of course, largely at the expense of the firms with
which they otherwise would have been grouped, wbose market value wiU decrease.
Although there is a strong presumption that the screening equilibria will not be
efficient, it is not obvious that there wiU be too much screening. The argument
" There are a number of interesting existence problems which arise in situations where prices
convey information; see, e.g. Kreps [1977], Grossman and Stiglitz [1976], and Green [1977]. Under
certain conditions, if tbere exists a complete set of markets, prices are fully revealing and equilibrium
does not exist. (See Grossman [1977], and Grossman-Stiglitz [1980b].)
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that there wiU be excessive investment in ability screening (Spence [1973]) was
based on models in wbicb tbere was no productive return to screening. Here,
there is clearly a produtive retum to allocating capital to managers who can
obtain a high return from it.'^
(ii) There are a variety of self-selection mechanisms by which information
about firm cbaracteristics can be conveyed to potential investors. For instance,
if stock holdings of informed inside managers are observable, they may serve as
a screening device. These managers (possibly tbe initial entrepreneur of the firm)
pay a "price" in holding significant fractions of their wealth in the given firm in
terms of the risks which they must bear. But they are more willing to do so if
their estimate of the mean retum to the firm is high (and the variance of the
retum is low). Note that this has an important implication: since managers will
be incompletely diversified, they may not act in a risk neutral way in making
investment decisions for the firm, even if other, "diversified" shareholders, would
like them to do so. (See Stiglitz [1974b].)
Similarly, if there is a high cost of bankruptcy, managers of firms with low
variances to their returns and high means wiU be willing to bave higher debt-
equity ratios. The financial structure of the firm thus conveys information. (See
Leland and Pyle [1977] and Ross [1977].)
Two qualifications to these self-selection (or signalling) information equilibria
need to be noted. First, in many instances the same information may be conveyed,
more efficiently, in some otber way; tbis is particularly true when tax considera-
tions are taken into consideration. Thus, the same information conveyed by the
firm's choice of a debt equity ratio might be conveyed by allowing tbe manager
a cboice among altemative compensation scbemes. (See Stiglitz [1975d].) Sec-
ondly, there are important existence problems associated witb competitive self-
selection equilibria. (See Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976].)
(iii) The models described above were formulated as if tbe firm wisbed to
"signal" to investors its characteristics; but tbe models could just as well bave
been formulated as if investors wished to screen potential investment opportun-
ites; and indeed, several recent models of the lending markets have been formu-
lated in precisely tbat way. Again, the various aspects of the firm's financial
structure (in particular its debt-equity ratio) can serve as a screening device. (See
Jaffee-RusseU [1976], Stiglitz-Weiss [1980].) As in otber screening models, equi-
librium is cbaracterized by non-linear "prices". As the amount individuals borrow
increases, the interest rate they pay increases.
But, in addition, other aspects of the loan contract,' e.g. the interest rate and
collateral requirements, can serve as screening devices. What is of particular
interest about tbese is that they generate equilibrium in wbich there is credit
rationing (and possibly price dispersion). For instance, under not implausible
conditions, riskier individuals (individuals who are more liable to default) are
willing to borrow at higher interest rates. Thus, as the interest rate charged by
tbe bank increases, the mix of applicants changes adversely. It may change
sufficiently adversely that the net retum to the bank is lowered. If, at this
'^  In the ability screening model, when there is a productive retum to screening (as when individuals
differ in their comparative advantage), then it can be shown that there may be too little screening in
the market equilibrium. (See Stiglitz [1981].)
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"optimum interest rate" demand exceeds supply, firms will ration credit. The
usual mechanism by which supply is equated to demand is that, in the presence
of excess demand, some unsatisfied customer offers a higher interest rate. Here,
however, when he does so, the bank infers (and on average, its inferences are
correct) tbat tbe individual is a sufficiently worse risk that he refuses to grant the
loan.
Similar adverse selection arguments apply to other aspects of the loan contract;
for instance, an increase in the collateral requirement may again decrease the
retum to the bank since tbose who have more collateral may be wealtbier, and,
witb decreasing relative risk aversion, wealthier individuals are more willing to
undertake risky projects.
(iv) The presence of differential information may seriously limit the effective-
ness of competition between banks. Tbe argument is a direct application of
corresponding arguments for the used car market and labor markets developed
by Akerlof [1970], Greenwald [1979], and Stiglitz [1981]. If tbe firm's present
banker is more informed of tbe cbaracteristics of the firm than other banks, any
otber bank wbicb attempts to compete away a "good borrower" may find his bid
matched, if the interest rate he offers is above that required for the banks to
break even on tbe loan; but if tbe interest rate tbe competitor offers is below that
required for the bank to break even on tbe loan, be will not attempt to matcb the
offer. Thus the competitor bank will obtain only tbose customers to whom it has
offered too "low" an interest rate. The argument applies with even more force to
banking institutions tban to labor markets: "used labor markets" perform a role
in matching firms and workers (botb in terms of tastes for non-pecuniary
characteristics and abilities); tbese "matcbing" arguments for secondary markets
are less persuasive for capital.
V. Incentives and Capital Markets^^
The interests of the supplier of capital (the lender or investor) and the manager
of capital (the borrower) will not, in general, coincide. For instance, in loan
markets, tbe lender is concemed only witb the probability that the firm defaults
on its loan and with the value of the firm in those states of nature where it
defaults; the borrower is concerned with the value of the firm in those states of
nature where it does not default. As a result, the supplier of funds would, if
information were costless, stipulate as finely as possible wbat actions the borrower
could take. But information is not costless, and one of tbe reasons tbat the lender
or investor turns control of his capital over to another is precisely because of
tbese information costs. StiU, tbe investor would like to design the terms at which
capital is provided to the entrepreneur in such a way as to lead the firm to take
actions which are in his interests. The supplier of capital faces, however, a
quandry.
On the one hand, if he supplies funds in the form of a loan, since the
entrepreneur would then be able to capture tbe full marginal returns to his
actions, if there were zero probability of bankruptcy, tbe entrepreneur would
" Most of the arguments presented in this section are developed more formally in Stiglitz-Weiss
[1980].
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bave "correct incentives." But tbe entrepreneur may not bave sufficient capital
to make the probability of default zero.
If tbe probability of default is not zero, then such contracts wiU not provide
"correct incentives." Behavior of the borrower will tben be affected by all tbe
terms of the contract, including the rate of interest and the relationship between
the availability of credit in the future and the interest rates charged in later
periods, and present perfonnance. The consequence is to strengthen the argu-
ments made earlier for credit rationing; raising the rate of interest charged on a
loan may lead the borrower to undertake riskier actions and the expected retum
to the bank may, as a result, actually be lower. (See also Keeton [1979].) Thus,
even if there is excess demand for funds at the interest rate which maximizes the
return to the bank, tbe bank may not raise tbe rate it cbarges. At this "optimal
interest rate" firms will, in general, be making a positive profit; tbus restricting
the availability of loans in later periods to those who are successful in earlier
periods provides an effective incentive for firms to undertake safe projects in
earlier periods. More generally, equilibrium will be cbaracterized by "contingency
contracts." Tbese contingency contracts bave furtber implications for the ex post
competitivity of the market: as in our earlier analysis of adverse selection, there
are serious impediments to individuals shifting from one banker to another.
(There is stUl ex ante competitivity: there is competition among banks in setting
the terms of the contracts.)
Loan contracts not only provide incorrect incentives, they impose considerable
risk on the entrepreneur, and if he is risk averse, he will want to share the risks
with others in the economy.
On the other hand, if the investor supplies funds in the form of equity, the
entrepreneur faces less risk, his bebavior witb respect to tbe choice of the
probability distribution of outcomes is not distorted in tbe way it is with loan
contracts, but he faces inadequate effort-incentives, since he captures only a
fraction of the return to his activities.
Thus both polar forms of contractual arrangements (pure debt, pure equity)
bave tbeir advantages and disadvantages. It is clearly not tbe case tbat the
financial structure of the firm is irrelevant. With detailed assumptions concerning
the supplier of capital and the "manager" (including the technological choices he
faces), we can derive the equilibrium contract, the debt-equity ratio which
represents a balancing of tbe various incentive (and adverse selection) consider-
ations presented in this and the preceding section.
An important aspect of the "control" (incentives) problem is that, once the
investor has tumed over control of his capital, in the form of equity, to another
individual, it may be very difficult for him to recover it or to regain control. (He
can, of course, seU his shares to someone else, but tbis simply switches the
problem to anotber individual.) The market provides only weak instruments for
ensuring that inefficient managers ("controllers of capital") are replaced by
efficient managers, particularly in widely held firms. For the usual reasons ("free
rider" problems, costly information), voting mechanisms do not work. Grossman
and Hart [1980] have shown how similar arguments can be used to explain why
with rational expectations the take-over mechanism has only limited efficacy.
Evolutionary processes are slow; they do not stop managers from squandering
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their present capital; they only stop him from acquiring additional capital to
waste.
In contrast, with loan contracts the lender can regain control of his capital in
a more direct fashion. If these loans are short lived, they subject tbe firm to
periodic review by outsiders. Tbis periodic review may act as an effective incentive
mechanism. (There are interesting questions concerning the optimal review
period—length of loan, which we cannot pursue here.) This argument suggests
that control over the managers of firms is not exercised so much by tbe sbare-
bolders, tbe suppliers of equity (although they nominally have "voting rights,"
these are not very effective), as by the lenders, who are in a position to withdraw
their capital if the firm "misbebaves." But it is also clear that the policies which
the bankers would like tbe firm to pursue are not, in general, consistent with
firms maximizing their value.
In short, owners of capital have only limited control over those to whom they
tum over use of their capital. They exercise control only indirectly (and then
imperfectly) by the design of financial structures, incentive pay schemes, rules
for take-overs, etc. (For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Stiglitz
[1980b].)
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a variety of arguments which, though granting the
seeming competitivity of the financial market, seriously question the presumption
of the optimality of the resource allocations to which it gives rise. The objective
of the analysis is not to advocate particular government interventions in the
financial market. Rather, it is intended to counter the argument that because tbe
market appears to be efficient and competitive, intervention would only lower
welfare. Tbe quantitative significance of these market failures, and whether
selective intervention could or would result in an improved allocation of resources
remain moot questions.
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